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Abstract
This  paper  analyzes  a  dynamic  mixed  duopoly  in  which  a  profit-maximizing
competitor  interacts  with  a  competitor  that  prices  at  zero  (or  marginal  cost),  with  the
cumulation  of  output  affecting  their  relative  positions  over  time.  The  modeling  effort  is
motivated by interactions between Linux, an open-source operating system, and Microsoft’s
Windows  in  the  computer  server  segment,  and  consequently  emphasizes  demand-side
learning effects that generate dynamic scale economies (or network externalities).  Analytical
characterizations of the equilibrium under such conditions are offered, and some comparative
static and welfare effects are examined.
Keywords:  Open-source  software,  Network  effects,  Microsoft,  Linux,  Competitive
dynamics, Strategy.DYNAMIC MIXED DUOPOLY:
A MODEL MOTIVATED BY LINUX VS. WINDOWS
I. Introdution
Mixed  duopoly  refers,  in  this  paper,  to  the  interactions  between  a  not-for-profit
competitor and a for-profit competitor. While this formalization is motivated by the case of
Linux vs. Windows that is described below, asymmetry with respect to profit maximization
also seems focal in the sense of representing the most obvious modification to the standard
assumption of symmetric profit maximization. Specifically, it is assumed that the not-for-
profit player prices its product at zero (or at marginal cost) and that the for-profit player must
take that commitment as given in making its own pricing decisions. The stylization evokes
not only interactions between open-source software development efforts (of which Linux is
one of many) and their for-profit competitors (of which Microsoft is one of many) but aspects
of a number of other types of interactions as well. These include interactions between a
profit-maximizer and a competitor pursuing volume or market share by pricing at marginal
cost, between profit-maximizers and much more patient competitors, between private and
state-owned/supported  enterprises  (e.g.,  Boeing  vs.  Airbus,  in  the  official  U.S.  view),
between  for-profit  firms  and  nonprofits,  or  even  the  social  sector,  broadly  defined  (e.g.,
between  pharmaceutical  firms  and  universities  in  the  life  sciences—although  those
relationships involve complementarities and side-payments as well as somewhat fragmented
competition), and between practice and research more generally (e.g., between management
consulting firms and business schools—which also involve cooperation and competition in
fragmented settings). As a first cut at pushing forward from the present state of analysis of
mixed duopolies, this paper focuses on the case in which the relationships between the two
players are basically competitive (e.g., as in Linux vs. Windows), but bringing cooperative
relationships into the picture would be an obvious and important next step.
Previous theoretical analyses of mixed duopolies, as defined above, have mostly been
static. The prototypical model of this sort analyzes competition between a profit-maximizer
and a sales-maximizer and confirms that if their products are substitutes, the profit-maximizer
fares worse, in terms of both volume and prices, than it would if it were facing another profit-
maximizer (as in the standard set-up). Specifically, if the sales-maximizer prices at zero or at a
common marginal cost, the profit-maximizer can make positive operating profits only to the
extent that the two’s products are imperfect substitutes for each other.  Especially since the
sales-maximizer’s  volume  is  predicted,  ceteris paribus,  to  be  higher  than  the  profit-
maximizer’s, might the former somehow displace or push out the latter from the market? That
and a number of other questions (e.g., welfare implications, comparative statics) animate the
explicitly dynamic model of mixed duopoly presented in this paper.
Note: We thank Miguel Angel García Cestona, Fabio Maneti, Patrick Moreton, and seminar participants at
NYU, the 2003 Strategy Research Forum held in Washington University, St. Louis, the 1st Meetings of the
International Industrial Organization Society, held in Boston, and the 2003 Society for the Advancement of
Economic Theory (SAET) conference, held in Rhodes, for useful comments.There are a number of interesting ways in which one might add some dynamics to
the prototypical, static model of mixed duopoly.  The extensive literature on competition in
the presence of learning-by-doing initiated by Spence [1981] seems particularly pertinent
since  it  focuses  directly  on  how  cumulated  output  can  reduce  costs  (or,  less  commonly,
improve willingness-to-pay) over time. The present paper can be read as an attempt to extend
that literature to a duopoly structure in which objectives are mixed rather than symmetric.
The focus falls on demand-side learning here, both because of the specifics of the Linux vs.
Windows  case  and  because  demand-side  learning  is  entirely  unstudied  from  a  mixed
perspective (whereas there are a few models of cost-side learning that can at least partially be
reinterpreted in these terms, e.g., models in which a dominant firm that is a price leader
competes with a price-taking fringe, e.g., Ross [1986]).
The focus on modeling the effects of learning on the demand side induces some
simplifications on the cost side. The baseline model in this paper assumes that marginal costs
are zero for both competitors. Cases with symmetric constant marginal costs are structurally
equivalent, and an extension to allow for a marginal cost penalty for the profit-maximizing
competitor is offered later on in the paper. Some of the conclusions can also be reinterpreted
to apply to cases in which the profit-maximizer incurs fixed cost flows for as long as it
chooses  to  remain  in  operation  as  well  as  marginal  cost  flows.  However,  the  full
endogenization of fixed cost investments in learning, as opposed to learning purely by doing,
is beyond the scope of this paper because of complexities that are hard to handle even within
the familiar confines of symmetric profit-maximization.  
The ultimate test of all these design choices that are embedded in the model of
dynamic  mixed  duopoly  developed  later  in  this  paper  is  whether  they  lead  anywhere
interesting. Several criteria, in addition to the basic requirement of theoretical coherence,
might be specified for such assessments: nonobviousness, breadth of applicability, policy
implications,  et  cetera.  But  the  particulars  of  the  model  must  be  specified  and  the
implications identified before assessments of whether they are interesting can be made. To
this end, Section II provides some background on Linux (and open-source software more
generally) vs. Windows, the case in which the model is grounded in a number of ways.
Section III lays out the basic model and comparative statics, and Section IV develops some
extensions.  Section V concludes.
II. Background: Linux, Open Source Software and Microsoft
The analyses of mixed duopoly in Sections IV and V of this paper are grounded in
the case of Linux vs. Windows in operating system software for computer servers that is
discussed in some detail in this section (and even more extensively in a teaching case). The
detail reflects the multiple ways in which such grounding helps with the modeling effort: by
helping determine some of the assumptions underlying the modeling effort, suggesting some
of the analyses to be performed with it, providing a basis for testing a (limited) number of its
implications as well as illustrating them, and also supplying some concrete, vivid ways of
representing the players in the model, their interactions, et cetera. (Linux vs. Windows is
more memorable and less likely to lead to confusion about objectives and roles than firm 1
vs. firm 2, for example.)
Despite this last use (or abuse) of the case, the model should not be thought of as a
literal representation of Linux vs. Windows: the references to the two in the later, analytical
sections are mostly meant to be metaphorical and not to suggest that a serious or deep policy
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the modeling effort are actually broader than developing a model of open-source software vs.
traditional, for-profit software firms, although the broader issues are apparent even within
that particular setting.  Specifically, there has been an extensive, and continuing, debate about
open-source as a system for innovation that ranges, at its extremes, from those who celebrate
open source in frankly liberationist terms to those who condemn it as an innovation destroyer
(“a threat to the American way,” in the words of one senior Microsoft executive).
In 2003, the Linux operating system was the best-known example of the burgeoning
open-source software movement2. Other major open-source successes included Apache, the
most popular software for running web servers, Sendmail, the dominant messaging service
program for routing and handling email used by email servers, and PERL, a programming
language for writing scripts allowing websites to call and run applications on a server. Open-
source’s smaller successes in enabling users to develop their own software applications were
considered  no  less  important,  however,  in  its  campaign  to  open  up  access  to  computer
software “source code”.
Open-source software development stressed collaboration among user-developers,
with  each  being  able  to  directly  alter  and  improve  the  product.  Traditionally,  when
programmers  modified  code,  they  altered  “source  code”  written  in  high-level  computer
languages such as Java, C++, and Unix that was compiled and then read by machines as
“object  code,”  expressed  in  machine  language  (a  string  of  0s  and  1s)  that  was  hard  for
humans to interpret.  Open-source projects let users directly modify source code, which was
freely available.  This was supposed to lead to continuous improvement of the product, as
bugs were patched and new capabilities were developed.  Traditional or “closed” software, on
the other hand, required that consumers purchase a license to run object code rather than
gaining access to source code.  Open-source software was distributed with “its sources and
the right to modify and redistribute it…” intact such that the original development paradigm
would continue. Open-source thus denoted itself not only a particular method for the creation
of software but also its distribution under a particular institutional framework.
The institutional framework for making a public good of software was provided by
the GNU Public License, or GPL, a new type of copyright created by the Free Software
Foundation in the late 1980s.  The GPL prohibited developers from making code proprietary,
by  preserving  the  right  of  anyone  to  “use  it,  copy  it,  modify  it,  and  distribute  their
modifications.”  Under GPL, derived works also had to be distributed under the same format,
which had important implications. This caveat prevented “software hoarding,” or taking code
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1 For instance, in early 2003, the migration rate to Linux seemed highest among server customers previously
using Sun’s proprietary stack of hardware and software with its own operating system variant on Unix,
Solaris.  While migration of this sort could be reinterpreted in terms of the duopoly model developed and
analyzed later in this paper as restricting Windows’ share growth, really taking it seriously would require a
somewhat different, more complex model—a triopoly at least.  
2 In this paper we use the expression “open source” to refer to both open source and free software (as defined
by Richard Stallman’s Free Software Foundation (FSF)). According to the FSF, a program is free software if
users have four fundamental freedoms: freedom to run the program for any purpose, freedom to study how
the program works and adapt it to the user’s needs, freedom to redistribute copies, and freedom to improve
the program and release improved versions to the public. This view is shared by the open source movement.
However, according to Richard Stallman, “the fundamental difference between the two movements [open
source  and  free  software]  is  in  their  values,  their  ways  of  looking  at  the  world.  For  the  Open  Source
movement, the issue of whether software should be open source is a practical question, not an ethical one. As
one person put it, ‘Open source is a development methodology; free software is a social movement.’ For the
Open Source movement, non-free software is a suboptimal solution. For the Free Software movement, non-
free software is a social problem and free software is the solution.”“private.” Lastly, in order to avoid the “closing” of code, the GPL also prohibited mixing
open-source with closed source code at the “source code” level.  In economic terms, the GPL
license attempted to establish the “public good” character of the software that it covered.
This copyright form quickly became known as “copyleft,” as it was diametrically opposed to
traditional  copyright  forms.  The  copyleft  license  was  maintained  by  the  Free  Software
Foundation, and enforced through Internet verification, as users clicked an “I agree” button
when downloading copyleft software.  The copyleft license was offered on take-it-or-leave-it
terms and without it, software was not considered open-source.  The provisions of the GPL
had yet to be tested in court, however.
Open-source  software  development  occurred  within  the  GPL  framework  and
involved efforts that varied greatly in terms of the scale and organizational complexity but
generally sought to harness demand-side learning more effectively than traditional “closed”
models.  Open-source development was supposed to compress development cycles, lead to
more “use-combinations” being tested and provide more of an incentive for users to report
problems or fixes than “closed” models, which might make users pay for improvements even
if they had suggested them.  Successful open-source software applications such as Apache
and  Linux  did,  on  a  number  of  dimensions  (e.g.,  defect  rates  and  speed  of  response  to
customer  problems),  exhibit  higher  quality  than  their  leading  for-profit  competitors
(Microsoft’s IIS and Windows NT respectively)—evidence concerning Linux in this regard is
discussed in a bit more detail below.
Such  quality-enhancing,  demand-side  learning  effects  had  been  compared  to
conventional cost-reducing supply-side learning curves with their traditional industrial logic
of cutting price, gaining share and reducing costs particularly rapidly (e.g., by the Boston
Consulting Group, an early proponent of the strategic importance of supply-side learning-by-
doing). In the context of open source software, the virtuous cycle was supposed to involve
giving source code away, attracting users through performance advantages as well as zero
prices,  and  drawing  on  users’  learning  and  contributions  to  increase  product  quality
particularly rapidly.  These efforts to harness demand-side learning had a number of essential
elements. First, they presumed a large number of users to report bugs—as evident in the
aphorism that “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are shallow.”  Second, smaller numbers of
users performed such essential functions as support, documentation and debugging and a
smaller number still developed most of the new code—although here too, there was need for
critical mass. Obviously, it helped if the users who valued the open source product more also
had the programming ability to customize it to their purposes.  As a result, engineering tools
and utilities made up a large percentage of open-source programs while word processors did
not. Third, good ideas—including all the major open-source successes cited above—were
generally thought to come from developers “scratching an itch” and providing their services
for free instead of following orders or trying to make money.  Fourth, the leaders of many
initiatives adopted policies of “release early, release often”—an emphasis greatly aided by the
Internet,  which  permitted  people  around  the  world  to  work  on  tasks  such  as  software
development in stable, coordinated ways.  Fifth, to the extent that the product was complex, it
had to be disaggregable into parallel modules for open-source development to work well.
Finally, open-source projects often complemented each other: for example, GNOME, also an
open-source project, was creating a graphical user interface (GUI) for Linux. Open-source
projects additionally helped each other in the sense that when one project gained legitimacy,
that created a halo-effect for the entire stable of open-source programs.
Linux was the most visible of myriad open-source projects: it was cited much more
often than any other project, more often even than the open-source movement itself.  Linux
was an operating system that reflected the contributions of over 3,000 developers in ninety
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well-defined  tasks,  such  as  recognizing  input  from  the  keyboard,  sending  output  to  the
display screen, keeping track of files and directories on the disk, and controlling peripheral
devices such as disk drives and printers.  At the heart of any operating system was the kernel
which, in Linux’s case, made up about 30% of the total number of lines of code in the OS.
Surrounding the kernel were modules: applications, utilities, ports etc.
The  Linux  initiative  began  in  1991,  when  Linus  Torvalds,  then  a  young
undergraduate at the University of Helsinki, began to develop Linux as a “Unix-like” kernel.
By October 1991, he released the first version of his “pet project” and by December, over one
hundred people had joined the Linux newsgroup mailing list.  In 1992, Torvalds integrated
his  work  with  that  already  completed  on  another  open-source  project,  GNU,  to  create  a
freely-available Unix-like OS.  Development then began in earnest, although it was initially
subject  to  significant  hardware  constraints.  The  size  of  the  Linux  kernel  grew  nearly
exponentially, from approximately 1 Megabyte (Mb), compressed, by the end of 1992 to 5
Mb by 1996 to about 20 Mb by 2000.  This growth brought both new functionalities and new
problems, as complexity grew. By July 2000, there were over four hundred Linux usergroups,
over 3,500 applications and more than 85,000 Linux-related messages generated per month.
And Linux had carved out a significant #2 position for itself in server OSs (for the powerful
computers that were the backbones of networked communicating), where it was narrowing
the market share gap with the dominant offering from Microsoft, but continued to have very
little presence in client OSs (for personal computers).
Server OSs were bought almost exclusively by corporations and the market for them
was segmented based on whether they were supposed to operate high-end servers that cost
more than $1 million, mid-range servers that cost from $100,000 - $1 million and the entry-
level segment that typically consisted of servers costing less than $100,000.  Within the
server OS market, Linux’s penetration was concentrated in the entry-level segment.
According to one set of estimates, the total number of Linux users was estimated to
have increased from 1,000 in 1992 to 20 million by 2000. The same source predicted that by
2004, the number of Linux users would increase to 30 million, across both client and server
OSs,  compared  to  338  million  for  Microsoft  products.  Furthermore,  by  2004,  Linux  was
expected to secure a 6% share of the client OS market and 37% of the server OS market of
installed  users,  compared  to  88%  and  43%,  respectively,  for  Microsoft’s  market-leading
products.  Focusing on the server OS market, Linux accounted for 2.0 million new licenses
worldwide in 2000, a 30% unit share, while Microsoft had 2.5 million new licenses of Windows
NT during the same year, a 38% unit share. Through 2004, the compounded annual growth rate
in  unit  server  OS  license  shipments  was  forecast  to  be  35%  for  Linux,  versus  somewhere
between 15% and 25% for Microsoft. Table 1 provides additional market share data.
Table 1. Market Share for Server Operating Systems (in percentage)
Sources: IDC, Brian Silverman, “Sun Microsystems, Inc.: Solaris Strategy”, HBS (February 2, 2001): 9-701-058.
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System 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Microsoft 7.0 18.1 25.6 35.3 38.3 38.1 38.5 39.5 40.5 41.0
Novell 39.6 34.7 32.1 26.7 22.8 19.1 15.0 13.0 12.0 10.0
Linux 0.0 0.0 6.5 6.8 15.8 24.8 30.0 34.0 36.0 38.0
Unix 28.6 25.4 20.1 20.9 18.8 15.5 15.0 13.0 12.0 10.0
Other 11.0 8.0 4.5 3.9 1.3 1.0 5.0 3.0 2.0 2.0Supporters explained Linux’s success at the expense of Microsoft’s Windows and
other closed server OSs in terms of numerous advantages: lower costs (see Table 2), fewer
bugs and more reliability, which were related to each other and to faster releases, better
interoperability across different computer platforms (since developers of new platforms could
alter Linux themselves), greater scalability (because it was bare-bone rather than feature-
heavy), modularity (since even the kernel was split into kernel modules starting with Linux
version 2.0), freedom from restrictions on the number of users attached to a server or the
number of servers on which a single copy of the OS could be installed, and the convenience
of being able to download the software from the Internet instead of having to obtain it in a
shrink-wrapped package.  Microsoft disputed many of these advantages, but the fact that
there was a dispute at all—compared to earlier, when Microsoft took no public notice of
Linux—suggested that this open-source development effort, like several others, had reached a
level of acceptance that Microsoft regarded as threatening.
Table 2. Linux vs. Microsoft Costs: Typical File/Print Server Network
Baseline: Linux Microsoft
Users supported 1,000 1,000
Number of servers 1 4
required
Software:
OS license per server $99 $4000
Client license $0 $128
Total software cost $99 $144,000
Hardware:
Cost per server $6,000 $6,000
Installation/server 250 250
Total hardware cost 6,250 25,000
Integration:
Time per server 32 16
Cost per hour 250 125
Total integration costs 8,000 8,000
Total Cost: 14,349 177,000
Source: Boston Consulting Group.
Microsoft appeared to stand to lose more than any other company from Linux’s
penetration  of  the  market  and,  more  generally,  open-source  software’s  success,  precisely
because of how well it had performed in the past: it was number 1 or 2 in all packaged
software categories, its flagship Windows product was installed on 95% of desktops, and it
had delivered a 58% average annual return to investors from 1989-1999. However, up to 25%
of Microsoft’s revenue was estimated to be at significant risk once threats from open-source
software  were  taken  into  account  (see  Table  3).  In  addition,  market  dominance  did  not
translate into resource dominance: Microsoft had had only 250 people working on Windows
NT—whose costs it had to shoulder in entirety—compared to the thousands of developers
working on Linux, mostly for free. In fact, some thought that Microsoft’s dominance was one
of the biggest spurs to the investment in and success of open-source software. In addition,
7allegations  of  market  dominance  by  Microsoft  had  also  engendered  significant  antitrust
concerns and constraints.
Table 3. Open-source Threats to Microsoft
Source: Tucker Anthony Capital Markets
One of Microsoft’s first acknowledgements of Linux as a viable competitor was in
1998, in documents later leaked (http://www.opensource.org/halloween), in which Microsoft
employees laid out plans for defending Microsoft’s franchise by moving to decommoditize
protocols and services by extending them in a proprietary manner,” thereby “locking out
customers and competitors.” In May 1999, Microsoft assigned a ten person “swat team” to
work specifically on the problem of Linux. And in July 2000, Microsoft announced its “dot-
net initiative” which sought to sell more software products as services (an application service
provider or ASP model) rather than as shrink-wrapped packages. The ASP model would
afford Microsoft more flexibility to try different pricing schemes, including a low-priced
subscription model that might compete effectively with open-source software.
Since then, Microsoft had stepped up the intensity of its rhetoric. Microsoft CEO
Steven Ballmer characterized Linux as “enemy no. 1.” Another senior executive described
open-source as the “worst thing to happen to the software industry” and the “thing that kills
innovation,”  and  painted  a  bleak  picture  of  a  world  in  which  immature  products  were
released and consumers suffered. While criticizing the GPL, Microsoft talked up its own
“Shared Source Philosophy (SSP),” which claimed to mine the best aspects of open-source
and which would be incorporated into Microsoft’s licensing model.  Elements of the SSP
included open-source access programs (some already mandated by the courts), educational
initiatives, and measures to improve customer feedback.  In the words of a senior Microsoft
executive,  SSP  was  a  “balanced  approach  that  allows  us  to  share  source  code…  while
maintaining the intellectual property.”
Even more recently, in summer 2002, Orlando Ayala, then in charge of worldwide
sales  at  Microsoft,  sent  a  confidential  e-mail  message  (later  leaked)  to  senior  managers,
including  CEO  Ballmer,  telling  executives  that  if  a  deal  involving  governments  or  large
institutions hung in the balance, they could draw on a special fund to offer the software at a
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Products 2000 revenue ($M) Percentage of Total Risk Level Open Source attackers
Server OS
NT Server 1,377 6 High Linux, Apache, BSD, Gnome
Windows 2000 1,836 8 High Gnome, KDE, SendMail, *BSD, PHP Perl
Client OS
Windows 98/ME 4,56 20 Medium Linux, GNOME, Helix, Eazel
NT Workstation 1,607 7 High Linux, GNOME, KDE
Applications
MS Office 8,611 38 Low Open Office, Gnumerics, K-Office
Exchange Server 942 4 Medium Sendmail
SQL Server 914 4 High MySQL, PostGRES, InPRISE, SAP
Internet Explorer 791 3 Medium Mozilla
Others
MSN 2,089 9 NA
Misc 229 1 NA
TOTAL 22,956 100steep  discount  or  even  free  if  necessary.  “Under  NO  circumstances  lose  against  Linux,”
according to the email3. 
Such interactions between not-for-profit open-source software and for-profit closed
software have not been studied much in the burgeoning literature on open source software,
which mostly focuses on how open-source development efforts are organized, particularly the
satisfaction of the individual participation constraints of user-developers who are critical to
learning on the demand side (see Appendix A). In particular, there seems to be a total dearth
of models that embed the competition between Linux and Windows in an explicitly dynamic
model with demand-side learning. Such a model is presented in the next section.
III.  A Model of Open Source vs. Closed Software
The  baseline  model  that  we  work  with  assumes  a  mixed  duopoly,  demand-side
learning for both open-source and closed development efforts, a commitment to price the
open-source product at zero, and strategic but nondiscriminatory pricing by the for-profit
player that accounts for the effects of current prices on learning and future customer appeal. 
We begin by specifying the demand side of the model. In each period t, a new
cohort of potential users enters the market. We normalize the  size of this cohort to 1. Let  
be the cumulative market share of operating system (OS) i at time t.
Thus, if q(τ ) is the portion of individuals in time  τ ’s cohort who buy Windows, then
where we use W and L to denote Windows and Linux, respectively. Thus, we assume that
every individual in each cohort uses one and only one OS; she either buys Windows or
downloads Linux for free. 
Let   where s is a scalar greater than zero. Let α i denote OS i’s
value by the cohort entering at time t and let α i = α i (y(t)). We refer to α i (y(t)) as OS i’s
technological  trajectory  (Foster,  1988).  OS  i’s  trajectory  is  a  function  of  its  cumulative
market  share,  yi(t),  and  the  competing  OS’s  cumulative  market  share,  y-i(t).  While
technological trajectories are exogenously given in the model, how far each OS can travel
down its trajectory is endogenous; the result of the dynamics of competition.
We assume that:
1.  We assume linear demand functions: Windows’ value to customer  q∈[0,1] is
(1)
Similarly, let the value of Linux be
(2) 
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2.    0, i.e., that OS i’s value increases with OS i’s cumulative market share. This
captures two kinds of effects: the more people use (or have used) a given OS, the more
feedback  is  likely  to  have  been  provided  for  improvement.  In  the  case  of  open  source
projects, users can make improvements directly on the code. In the case of closed software,
users can call up or email the software developer with suggestions. In addition, the larger yi(t)
is, the more complements are likely to be available for OS i. Availability of complements
increases the value of the OS.  
The  assumption  also implies  that  , i.e., OS  i’s value decreases as the
cumulative market share of the competing OS increases.  Again, this is related to the attention
and effort that third-party developers devote to creating new and improving old software and
hardware.  An OS is more likely to get developers’ attention if its cumulative market share is
relatively large. The larger y-i(t) (holding yi(t) constant), the less effort will be devoted to
developing complements for OS i, and vice versa.  This reduction jeopardizes the value of
OS  i because  bugs  are  not  fixed  as  often,  programs  are  not  updated,  new  software  and
hardware  may  not  work/communicate  as  well  with  existing  software  and  hardware,
unforeseen compatibility issues are more likely to arise, et cetera.
3.             , i.e., OS i’s value is finite, even if everyone uses the OS.
Also,                           , i.e., OS i’s value approaches zero if everyone uses the other OS. Thus,
technological  trajectories  are  bounded;  there  is  an  upper  bound  on  the  maximum  value
created by each operating system. The case in which             corresponds to a situation where
Linux’s potential quality is strictly larger than that of Windows. Assumptions 2 and 3 imply
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value OS i at v
or more
Potential customers at
time t that value OS i
less than v4. Let                                  then for y>y0, where y0 is the value of y for
which  both  Linux  and  Windows   are   perceived as equally valuable. (Formally,  y0
solves ;  assumptions 2 and 3 imply that y0 is unique.) This assumption says that
cumulative market share has a decreasing marginal effect on the difference in value between
Windows and Linux5.  
As mentioned above, we assume that, everything else constant, as yi grows, the
vertical  intercept  α i(y) in  the  demand  function  also  increases.  Thus,  as  the  accumulated
market  share  (or  installed  base)  of  OS  i grows,  the  value  of  the  OS  also  grows  for  all
potential customers. 
Recall that              . Formally, s is the absolute value of the derivative of
y with respect to  yL.  If s >1(<1), then increases in  yL have more (less) of a positive impact
on  perceived  quality  of  Linux  than  the  negative  impact  of  comparable  increases  in  yW.
Parameter s has two complementary interpretations: the differential in demand-side learning
between Linux and Windows and the differential strength of network externalities due to the
availability of complementary software. Thus, for a given level of network externalities due
to  complements,  increases  in  s correspond  to  a  strengthening  in  Linux’s  demand-side
learning. 
Example. The following S-shaped technological trajectories satisfy the assumptions6. 
Let λ ∈  (0,1). Let
and
In this example, Windows is more valuable than Linux whenever  .
Assuming           ,          2 and         3, then functions α W and α L look as follows:
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3 α W = α L =
5 This is a technical assumption that simplifies exposition. It can be relaxed to: there is               such that for
all            ,                . With this assumption, there may be more than two steady states. If there are multiple
steady states, our results on yss (the stable steady state) hold unchanged for the steady state with the largest y.
6 Strictly speaking, the functional forms in the example satisfy the assumptions at all points other than y = 0,
because at this point the trajectories are not differentiable.
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αIn  what  follows,  we  analyze  the  dynamics  of  competition  and  its  effects  on
cumulative market shares yW and yL.
Dynamics of competition
We  distinguish  between  two  cases:  one  in  which  Microsoft  is  a  monopolist  and
another in which it is a duopolist, competing to sell Windows against Linux.
Monopoly
In a monopolistic market structure, there is no substitute for Windows and potential
customers are willing to pay something (even only a small amount) for Windows.  Inverse
demand follows directly from equation (1). Let r be Microsoft’s discount rate and assume
that marginal cost of an extra copy of Windows is zero. Microsoft solves:
subject to 
The following proposition will be useful in comparing monopoly and duopoly.
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0 0Proposition 1 As t          ,                 and                        .7
Therefore, profit per period approaches        and deadweight loss per period goes to
.
Duopoly
When both Windows and Linux are available and Windows is sold at a price p, the
customer precisely indifferent between the two,  q, is given by:
Thus, inverse demand is











7 All proofs are contained in Appendix B.
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p(t)
β (y(t)) = p(t)Notice that in this model, customers in every new cohort are assumed to be myopic
in the sense that they buy the OS that is immediately most valuable to them (after subtracting
price). The extension to the case of forward-looking buyers is developed in Section IV.
We assume that at time t = 0, Windows is perceived as more valuable than Linux.
That is,  β( y(0))>0 .  Note that when Microsoft sets p = 0 and β (y)>0, demand for Windows is 1
(the size of the entering cohort). Thus, as long as β (y)>0, Microsoft can capture the entire
new cohort by setting p = 0.  However, in this case profit is also 0.  The customer who most
values Windows, is willing to pay no more than β (y), an increasing function of market share
yw, for it.  In contrast, if market shares are such that β (y) ≤ 0 (Linux’s perceived quality is at
least as large as that of Windows), then nobody is willing to pay anything for Windows.
(3)
Let r be the discount rate.  Microsoft’s problem is:
(4)
We  can  therefore  use  standard  phase  diagram  analysis  to  examine  the  long-run
dynamics of competition.
Proposition 2. Windows and Linux coexist in the long-run, steady-state equilibrium
as long as s >1.  When s ≤  1, Windows pushes Linux out of the market.
Proof. The proof involves using phase diagram analysis to graphically represent the
path  leading  to  steady  state  and  show  that  path  is  optimal  by  checking  Mangasarian’s
sufficient conditions. See Appendix B.
Proposition 2 implies that Microsoft is never pushed out of the market by the free,
open source operating system, regardless of the speed of demand-side learning (the value of
s), the difference in potential maximum values                , and market shares at time t = 0.  The
phase diagram looks as follows:
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() () () t q s t q y − − = 1 &The two steady states y0 and yss are characterized by
β (y0) = 0
and 
(5)
respectively.  The phase diagram reveals that y0 is unstable and yss is a saddle point.
With the functional forms assumed in example 1, the two steady states can be
computed explicitly. The unstable steady state is
and the saddle point is
Notice that              .  For example, when                                  , and  , the
steady states are           and           .  In this example, if y ever fell below     Windows would
be perceived as less valuable than Linux. As long as         , Microsoft’s pricing strategy
guarantees that y (t) never falls below    and thus Windows is not pushed out. The value of  β
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y0
y
mThe result that Windows will persist in the long run regardless of the difference
between potential values of Windows and Linux (        and        ) and regardless of the speed
of demand-side learning on the part of Linux (s) is central to our inquiry on the competitive
dynamics  between  open-source  and  closed  software.  Contrary  to  earlier  results  on
competition with network externalities, in our model the failure of Linux to replace Windows
is not due to switching or search costs (see, for example, David (1985)). Furthermore, the
failure of a higher potential quality OS to eventually win the market out is not related to
demand-side coordination issues (as in Farrell and Saloner (1985, 1986)) because demand
coordination does not raise the instantaneous value of the OS on which buyers coordinate.  In
our model, without Microsoft’s forward-looking pricing strategy, Windows would inevitably
wind up being replaced by Linux (whenever            and     ). Instead, it is Microsoft’s
strategic actions that generate the result. The market does not fully tip to Linux because
Microsoft’s strategic decisions prevent that from happening.
More generally, much of the network externalities literature focuses on one profit-
maximizing firm versus another or, if looking at demand-side issues, assumes competitive
supply. Instead, we look at asymmetric/mixed mode competition. In particular, the interaction
between for-profit and not-for-profit entities seems particularly interesting in the context of
knowledge development/innovation. In addition, our model features explicit dynamics, not a
two-period abstraction as in much of the literature on network externalities.
It is interesting to notice that it is never optimal for Microsoft to “milk” its initial
advantage                     by setting high prices in the short term and at some future point leave
the market. To understand why, notice first that the myopic profit-maximizing price in period
determined to milk its short-term advantage, it would eventually set prices at this level (this
would be Microsoft’s optimal choice in the period immediately preceding its exit). Consider
now a downward price deviation from this myopic (or “milking”) profit-maximizing price to
– δ  where δ > 0. The new profit in period t is   ,  which is strictly less
than the myopic profit that period. However, by reducing price by δ , Windows is more valuable in
period t+1 than if price had been maintained at the myopic level because quantity sold in period
t is larger. In particular,    instead of   .
price in period t+1  , the net present value of profit as a function of δ can be
expressed as:
The derivative of NPV(π ( δ ))  at δ = 0 is:
Therefore, regardless of the discount rate and regardless of the size of the initial
advantage, it is always the case that, starting from the myopic profit-maximizing price, it is
optimal to reduce current price a little bit. The reduction in instantaneous profit is more than
offset by the corresponding increase in profit next period. 
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12312 43 41 2 3More precisely: the derivative of instantaneous profit evaluated at the myopic
price                    is 0 (by definition). However, the period before Windows exits, it must be
the case that                  and because                  , we have that                 . Therefore, that last
period lowering price a tiny little bit has a huge effect on next period’s perceived value of
Windows and almost no effect on the present period profit level. Thus, it is optimal for
Windows to always set a lower price than the myopic optimum.
The following comparative statics are of interest:
Proposition 3 Assume s > 1, then
That is, 
(a) The  larger  Linux’s  demand-side  learning,  the  smaller  the  steady-state
difference in accumulated market shares between Windows and Linux. Once the
steady state has been reached, yss is a constant but yW and yL keep growing without
bound. 
According  to  (b),  the  more  myopic  Microsoft  is,  the  more  similar  are  the
steady-state  perceived  qualities  of  Windows  and  Linux.  And  the  more  patient
Microsoft is, the greater the long-term perceived quality advantage of Windows.
(c) Even as the sensitivity of y to yL goes to infinity, there is a lower bound on
yss strictly greater than y0. As a consequence, if Windows is ahead, it will stay ahead
regardless of the value of s.
(d)  As  Linux’s  demand-side  learning  approaches  1,  if  Windows  is  ahead,
Linux will eventually be forced out of the market.
(e) The only case in which Microsoft is pushed out by Linux is if Microsoft is
completely myopic. In this case, Microsoft goes after exactly 50% of every new
cohort, but then if s > 1, Linux’s effective cumulative market share will eventually
become orders of magnitude larger than Windows’. In the long-run Windows is less
valuable than Linux.
(f) If Microsoft became completely patient, it would effectively push Linux
out of the market.
Having  computed  explicitly  the  stable  steady  state,  it  is  trivial  to  calculate  the
implied quantities, prices, and profits, and to establish the following corollary:
Corollary  Microsoft’s steady-state price and profit is always lower in a duopolistic
industry structure.
Clearly, at monopoly prices some customers prefer to get Linux for free.  Microsoft
takes this into account and lowers prices.
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The most immediate way to overturn the result that Windows will prevail no matter
the  strength  of  Linux’s  demand-side  learning  is  by  introducing  cost  asymmetries.  In
particular, let c be a per-unit (marginal) cost for Windows and assume Linux’s unit cost is
zero.  This can be thought of as production or sales cost, post-sales service, et cetera.
With c, we rewrite Microsoft’s objective function as
and solve problem (4) with the exact constraints (see the proof of Proposition 2).
The  presence  of c jeopardizes  Microsoft’s  ability  to  control  the  share  of  each
entering cohort that is captured by Linux.  As a consequence, if Linux’s demand-side learning
s is large enough, Linux can ‘force’ Windows out of the market.
It is also interesting to notice that with c, s does not need to be greater than 1 for
Linux to be able to stay a viable competitor. If Microsoft’s ability to build share is less than
perfect, then yL will increase relatively more rapidly and s > 1 is unnecessary for the viability
of Linux.  In the example, if          , with k > 1, the maximum number of  customers that
Windows can get out of each cohort (if price is greater than or equal to marginal cost) is less
than      .  As k → 1 , Linux’s period market share approaches 1.
Welfare
The corollary above suggests that a duopolistic industry structure is likely to dominate
Microsoft’s monopoly in terms of total welfare generation.  Also, if Linux’s potential quality
is above that of Windows  (          ), one would expect that Linux’s monopoly should
dominate  Windows’  monopoly  and  the  duopoly.  In  this  section  we  analyze  the  welfare
implications of each industry structure and show that neither of these claims is necessarily
true. 
We begin by analyzing welfare for the new cohorts entering after the steady state has
been  reached.  The  case  where  Microsoft  is  a  monopolist  is  immediate.  Total  surplus
(producer plus consumer surplus) is
Similarly, Linux’s monopoly steady-state total surplus is
Thus, Linux’s monopoly is socially more desirable than a Windows’ monopoly as
long as                 . 
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4More interesting is the comparison between a Windows monopoly and a Windows-
Linux duopoly. The following figure summarizes the computation of total surplus generated
by the duopoly (total surplus is the sum of the shaded areas): 
Using equations (A1) and (A9) in Appendix B, it can be easily shown that total
surplus generated by Windows is given by
,
and that of Linux by
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2 ααWhether TSDuopoly is greater or less than              is ambiguous. There are two
reasons  why  duopoly  can  enhance  consumer  surplus.    First,  because  Linux  is  available,
Microsoft is induced to set lower prices.  Second, those individuals in the cohort who do not
buy Windows are not left empty-handed, they can download and use Linux for free and this
raises total surplus.  However, the fact that part of the population uses Linux lowers the
perceived value of Windows (because there is some substitution of third-party complement
development from Windows to Linux). If this effect is large, monopoly (where all developers
produce complements for Windows) may result in larger total surplus.
To see formally that the comparison between TSDuopoly  and              is ambiguous,
suppose  first  that  for  some  technological  trajectories  (α w(.)  and  α L(.))  we have that   
. Consider now a new technological trajectory α *
w (y) that coincides with
everywhere up to a point  y* > yss.  From  that  point on,  a*
w (y)  grows  linearly
(with slope        ) up to a magnitude larger than      . From that point on,           levels
off. Clearly, with this new technological trajectory,                               . 
Let’s now consider the case in which for some technological trajectories
. Let r → 0 .                does not change. However, by Proposition 3(f),
yss →∞ and thus                      . Furthermore, by (A1) and (A9),   . These 
are  the  same  and  with  a  duopoly  Windows  is  sold  at  a  lower  price,  it  is  the  case  that
. 
Therefore, 
Proposition 4 Steady-state total surplus may be larger under Windows’ monopoly
than under duopoly.
We conclude this section with an observation about welfare on the path to the steady
state. As mentioned above, when                 , steady-state total welfare under Linux monopoly
is larger than steady-state total welfare under Windows monopoly or duopoly.  However, if it
will  take  a  long  time  for  Linux  to  build  market  share,  Linux’s  monopoly  may  still  not
maximize the net present value of total surplus.  More precisely, let ρ be the regulator’s
discount rate and                                                               , be period t’s total surpluses under
Windows monopoly, duopoly, and Linux monopoly, respectively. Suppose that users die at
rate δ  ; that is, if  M users are alive in period t, then  δΜ users will be alive in period t+1 (in
addition to the new entrants). The net present value of total surplus can then be expressed as:
Although it is not possible to get explicit price sequences on the path to the steady
state, it is immediate to conclude that Linux’s monopoly may not maximize net present value
of welfare, the reason being that if α L(y(0))  is substantially lower than α W (y(0)) and ρ is
high (so that future welfare enhancements are discounted heavily), then the immediate larger
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α W y ()IV. Extensions
We now present three simple extensions to the basic model: forward-looking buyers,
strategic commitment to Linux and piracy of Windows.  Forward-looking buyers may play to
the advantage of Microsoft, and strategic commitment helps Linux build market share, but
may or may not be welfare-enhancing.  Even less expectedly, piracy helps Windows increase
its  steady-state  quality  difference,  and  may,  therefore,  result  in  increased  profits  for
Microsoft.
Forward-looking buyers
Let  φ be  the  (common)  discount  rate  used  by  buyers  to  evaluate  future  utility.
Suppose that present time is t, that the state variable has value y(t) and that price is p. The
threshold buyer q is found by solving:
(9)
(To  see  this,  compute  consumer  surplus  for  given  p and  notice  that  individual  utility
maximization  is  equivalent  to  total  surplus  maximization.)  Notice  that  when  φ  =  ∞ ,  (9)
reduces to                    , just as in the benchmark model with myopic buyers.
We analyze the case in which buyers are forward-looking but believe that they are so
insignificant  that  their  purchase  decision  will  not  affect  the  state  variable.  With  this
assumption, (9) can be rewritten as:
.
Solving the program yields:
.
(10)
Comparing (10) and the demand function in the benchmark model  (                   ),
we see that whether the threshold  q with forward-looking buyers is larger or smaller than
that with myopic buyers depends on the buyers’ view on which OS will be more valuable in
the future. In particular, when            is large and positive and buyers’ discount rate is not too
low, the presence of forward-looking buyers plays to the advantage of Microsoft because for
a given p, the threshold q is now larger than with myopic buyers. However, if buyers expect
β (y(t)) to eventually turn negative and their discount rates are low, Microsoft will be forced to
price lower than in the case where buyers are myopic. 
Equation (10) shows that it may be worth for Microsoft to influence the value of
by infusing “fear, uncertainty, and doubt” into the OS user community.
Such emotions were stirred in the Linux community by, among other things, SCO, a small
Swiss-based “vulture” firm that had bought up the intellectual property rights to a particular
version of Unix and was threatening Linux users with lawsuits over infringement of those
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β yt () ()prime corporate sponsors of Linux as well as the target of a lawsuit by SCO that sought $1
billion in damages, alleged in mid-2003 that SCO was in cahoots with Microsoft9. 
However, regardless of the value of                                    , Microsoft can once again
guarantee a 100% market share of every new cohort by pricing sufficiently low. Therefore,
the result that Microsoft is not pushed out of the market by Linux (regardless of the intrinsic
advantages of Linux) remains intact when buyers are forward-looking.
Strategic Commitment to Linux 
Strategic commitment to Linux may manifest itself in governmental procurement
decisions, in decisions by strategic buyers such as IBM with a direct economic interest in
opposing  Microsoft,  and  so  on.    For  example,  our  qualitative  attempt  to  classify  the
governments  in  several  dozen  countries  on  the  basis  of  the  software  platform  that  they
supported  identified  13  countries,  with  the  European  Community  particularly  well-
represented, that seemed to be in the Linux camp, versus five in the Microsoft camp and 12
in which governments seemed to have made relatively clear commitments to both platforms
(see Appendix C for details).  Note that some degree of intrinsic affinity might be expected
between the open-source movement and governments in the presence of shared nonprofit
objectives; in addition, government procurement seems, in this category as in many others,
more price-sensitive, on average, than private or at least corporate procurement.
To model such effects, suppose that a measure ε > 0  of customers in every cohort
are  committed  to  Linux  for  some  reason  of  this  sort.  It  is  important  to  identify  those
customers.  We distinguish two polar cases.  First, the potential customers represented by ε
would have used Linux even if they were not committed to Linux.  In this case, there is no
change.  The steady state yss is as given by equation (5).
Second, suppose that these ε customers would all have bought Windows had they
not been committed to Linux.  These are individuals that value Windows above Linux (after
subtracting p ) but they use Linux instead.  We now examine the effect of such commitment
on long-run competitive dynamics.
Recall that, absent strategic commitment to Linux, demand for Windows is
But  because  ε ‘would-be-buyers’  of  Windows  are  committed  to  Linux  instead,
demand for Windows is 
or   
The equation of motion of y is as before (eq. 3), y=q(t)–s(1–q(t)).
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ε pqy =− − () ( ) 1 εβMicrosoft’s problem is
Solving for the unique saddle point steady state yss (see proof of Proposition 2), we
obtain
(12)
Strategic commitment to Linux by a portion ε  of Windows’ ‘would-be-buyers’ has
two effects:  it helps build market share of Linux, thus increasing its value vis a vis Windows,
and it also forces Microsoft to lower its prices for Windows.  A simple computation using eq.
(12) yields:
,
a negative number for ε small.
The  following  proposition  shows  that  with  the  presence  of  strategic  buyers,  if
demand-side learning on the part of Linux is sufficiently swift, Windows is pushed out.
Proposition 6 For given ε, if s is sufficiently large, Microsoft is pushed out of the
market. Equivalently, for given s, if εis sufficiently large, Microsoft is pushed out of the market.
Intuitively, when s is large, Microsoft has to make sure that Linux’s share (1-q(t))
remains very small. However, the presence of a portion of potential customers who will never
buy Windows jeopardizes Microsoft’s ability to capture (current cohort) market share. If such
ability is sufficiently damaged by these strategic buyers, Windows is eventually pushed out.
Therefore, if s is large, strategic commitment to Linux induces efficient push-out of
Windows by Linux. However, if s is small so that, without strategic commitment, Linux
would be efficiently pushed out by Microsoft, with strategic commitment Linux may prevail.
We conclude that strategic commitment to Linux may enhance total welfare if s is
large,  because  that  may  push  Windows  out  when  it  is  efficient  to  do  so.    But  strategic
commitment to Linux may reduce total welfare if s is very small because then Linux will not
be pushed out even though its push-out would increase welfare. 
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We can also use an extension of the model developed earlier to analyze the effects of
piracy, as in the illegal copying, distribution, and use of software.  Of course, because Linux
is free, it is only meaningful to talk about piracy of Windows.
Suppose that every period, a portion ρ of the entering cohort pirates Windows. We
assume that the portion of pirates is small (positive but sufficiently close to zero for an
interior solution to exist). Again, it is important to identify who these customers are.  Suppose
a  portion  µ  ∈ (0,1) comes  from  individuals  who  have  bought  Windows  (high-value
customers) and the rest,  1–µ, would have gotten Linux (low-value customers).
Because  ρµ ‘would-be buyers’ pirate Windows, demand for Windows at price p is
.
Notice that  yW = q + ρ and yL = 1–q – ρ . Therefore,
Microsoft’s problem is:
Solving the program, the unique saddle point steady state is characterized by:
. (13)
Let
Differentiating (13) implicity, we see that   
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ssAn increase in piracy ρ has two effects. On the one hand, if µ  < 1 , some people that
would have chosen Linux, now use Windows because they get the OS for free. So, there is an
increase in period market share of size ρ (1–µ). On the other hand, if µ  > 0 , some people who
would have bought Windows now get Windows for free. This does not affect instantaneous
market share, but shrinks demand and Microsoft is induced to set lower prices and, as a
consequence, the steady-state market share differential also increases.
Finally,
is negative (for ρ  small). The larger the piracy by ‘would-be buyers’, the less the increase in
instantaneous market share (as compared to a situation where piracy comes from individuals
who would have used Linux).
The following example shows that piracy may be beneficial to Microsoft not only in
terms of larger steady-state market share, but also in terms of steady-state profit.
Example 2. Assume the functional forms in Example 1 and set s = 3,  r = 10%,
µ =.3,            , and          . Solving for the steady-state profit as a function of piracy ρ , we
have:
Some Evidence 
We  compiled  data  on  total  Windows  and  Linux  shipments  for  a  sample  of  51
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α W = 1 α L = 2Notice  that  just  as  the  results  above  show,  piracy  rates  (row  L)  are  negatively
associated with Linux penetration (column G) and the Linux/Microsoft ratio.
V. Conclusions
The specification, analysis and (very partial) testing of the model of dynamic mixed
duopoly in Sections III and IV of this paper was informed in multiple ways by the case of
Linux vs. Windows that was described in Section II. The case suggested a specific way of
framing the interactions between open-source software development initiatives and their for-
profit competitors: in terms of competition between an open-source product priced at zero
and  a  for-profit  “closed”  product,  in  the  presence  of  demand-side  learning  effects.
Accordingly, this paper set up and analyzed a highly stylized model of this sort in order to
characterize the equilibrium outcomes to dynamic competition of this sort and some of their
comparative  static  and  welfare  properties.  The  analysis,  in  particular,  while  not  game-
theoretic in the usual sense of interdependent strategy choices, was strategic in the sense of
requiring  Microsoft  Windows  to  take  a  deep  look  into  the  future  that  recognized
intertemporal linkages in its profit function (e.g., between past or current choices and future
profits) as opposed to acting myopically, which would have led to very different predicted
outcomes. As Arrow [1964] and others have stressed, such intertemporal linkages and the
commitment  or  irreversibility  underlying  them  are  the  key  reason  that  the  optimal
intertemporal investment program may not coincide with the instantaneous equation of the
marginal productivity and the marginal cost of capital (of whatever sort), i.e., the myopic
investment program.
Embedding  irreversibility  in  the  form  of  sticky  resources  in  a  formal  analytical
model  of  mixed  duopoly  yielded  some  arguably  surprising  conclusions.  Thus,  Microsoft
Windows’  persistence  exceeded  our  pre-analytic  intuitions  because  of  the  effects  of
Microsoft’s strategic management of its position relative to Linux   Other effects/possibilities,
e.g., that strategic procurement of Linux could hurt welfare, were somewhat unexpected. And
other  effects  were  surprising  for  other  reasons,  such  as  the  apparent  first-order  effect  of


















































(B) Nominal GDP (US$ at PPP) per Capita 1.00
(D) Population (millions) -0.33 1.00
(G) Linux share 0.35 -0.23 1.00
(H) Linux/MS ratio 0.37 -0.27 0.89 1.00
(I) Total Shipments 0.11 0.09 -0.23 -0.10 1.00
(I/B) Total Shipments/GDP -0.03 0.45 -0.30 -0.20 0.91 1.00
(I/D)Total Shipments/Pop 0.18 0.00 -0.22 -0.12 0.96 0.84 1.00
(L) Piracy Rates (%) 2000 -0.67 0.37 -0.43 -0.50 -0.08 0.11 -0.11 1.00
(N) Growth Competitive Index 2001 0.65 -0.21 0.27 0.25 0.08 0.00 0.15 -0.75 1.00
(O) Technology Index 2001 0.57 -0.32 0.32 0.29 0.04 -0.08 0.10 -0.77 0.92 1.00
(P) Innovation subindex 2001 0.70 -0.31 0.43 0.39 0.07 -0.06 0.14 -0.74 0.87 0.89 1.00
(Q) ICT subindex 2001 0.65 -0.37 0.42 0.42 0.06 -0.07 0.14 -0.84 0.92 0.91 0.86 1More broadly, the present paper can also be read as an attempt, under admittedly
specializing  assumptions,  to  analyze  interactions  between  for-profit  and  not-for-profit
competitors.  We  know  very  little  about  competitive  interactions  in  such  a  setting  even
though, as Section I indicated, mixed objective functions of this sort can be thought of as
covering  a  very  broad  range  of  situations.  This  paper  has  made  a  very  modest  start  at
addressing this large gap in our knowledge.
27Appendix A: Prior Research on Open-Source Software
Much  of  the  prior  literature  on  Linux/open-source  focuses  on  how  open-source
development  efforts  are  organized,  particularly  (as  noted  above)  the  satisfaction  of  the
individual  rationality  or  participation  constraints  of  user-developers  who  are  critical  to
learning on the demand side. For compactness, we will refer to this as the organizational
strand of research on open-source.
The most focused substrand of organizational research on open-source has assumed
utility-maximizing  (potential)  users/developers  and  has  tried  to  derive  various  sorts  of
comparative static predictions about their developmental contributions. In early work of this
sort, Thorn and Connolly [1987] used theories of the economics of public goods to argue that
the rates and effectiveness of discretionary information-sharing amongst employees in an
organization would tend to decrease as (1) participation costs increased; (2) the size of the
overall group increased; (3) the value of information to participants decreased; and (4) the
asymmetries in information values and benefits across participants increased.
More recent work in this line has pushed farther with formalizing these insights and
developing new ones. Thus, Kuan [1999] framed consumer choice between open and closed-
source  software  as  a  make-or-buy  decision,  with  the  former  option  entailing  a  further
decision about how much effort to exert contributing to the quality of software (a public
good),  and  concluded  that  the  advantages  of  open-source  software  were  higher  for
programmers than nonprogrammers. He also inferred that if most high-paying users were
also  programmers,  open-source  or  community  organization  would  be  more  likely  (e.g.,
engineering  tools  or  utilities),  whereas  if  most  high-paying  users  were  nonprogrammers,
proprietary  or  closed  organization  would  be  more  probable  (e.g.,  word  processors,
spreadsheets and other products with a broad non-engineering market). Bessen [2002] also
analyzed a self-selection model with consumers helping test and debug different variants of a
complex product with many (interacting) features, of which only a fraction might be valuable
to any particular user. He concluded that given open source, individual users who placed a
high enough value on the product would test and debug their own use-product and that, as
long  as  costs  were  sufficiently  low  and  product  complexity  sufficiently  high,  more  use-
product combinations would be tested with open source than under the proprietary case, a
larger market would be served, and social welfare would be higher. Johnson [2002] analyzed
a self-selection model with various informational imperfections and concluded that whether
open-source  development  would  increase  when  applications  had  a  modular  structure
depended on whether the developer base exceeded a critical size; he also provided some
finite and asymptotic results of effects of changing the population size of user programmers
and tried to explain why certain useful programs don’t get written. Xu [2002], with a variant
of the same basic model, showed that decreasing open-source development costs need not
necessarily increase the amount of open-source software development, and proposed several
other counterintuitive results as well. And so on.
A  second  substrand  of  the  organizational  literature  has  looked  somewhat  more
broadly  at  whether  open-source  software  development  efforts  can  be  explained  as  the
outcome  of  private  cost-benefit  analysis  by  user-developers  or  whether  other,  less
conventionally economic motivations—e.g., altruism, participation in a gift economy/culture
in which social status depends more on what one gives away than what one possesses, or
even a visceral dislike of Microsoft—need to be invoked to explain private provision of the
public  good  of  improved  software  quality.  Thus,  Lerner  and  Tirole  [2002]  argued  that 
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conventional cost-benefit analysis may be sufficient once one accounts for benefits related to
career  concerns  and  ego  gratification  (stemming  from  peer  recognition)  that  induce  an
incentive  for  an  individual  to  signal  high  quality  through  participation  in  open-source
development. They also suggested that signaling incentives might be strengthened in open-
source  environments  by  better  performance  measurement  (given  the  care  with  which
individual contributors tend to be credited), full initiative by (empowered) programmers, and
greater labor market fluidity/knowledge portability, and that other factors favorable to open
source include modularity, the existence of “fun” challenges and credible leadership.  And, in
a similar vein, Lakhani and von Hippel [2002] looked—in the context of Apache—at the
performance of the mundane but essential task of providing high-quality field support (to
overcome  either  defects  in  the  product  or  deficiencies  in  the  user’s  understanding)  and
concluded  that  the  need  for  explanations  such  as  altruism  and  even  (delayed)  signaling
benefits was limited by the inference that most of the effort information-providers expended
could be understood in terms of the direct rewards they derived immediately, i.e., in terms of
learning for themselves.
A  third,  more  miscellaneous  substrand  of  the  organizational  literature  on  open-
source  has  taken  the  even  broader,  more  inductively-oriented  approach  of  describing  the
actual organization of such software development efforts. Thus, three of the core contributors
to  the  development  of  Apache,  Mockus,  Fielding  and  Herbsleb  [2000],  built  on  their
experience of that project, as well as the history of others, including Linux, to offer some
rough numerical requirements for their organization: a core group of developers, no larger
than  15  people,  to  control  the  approval  and  integration  of  new/modified  code  into  the
ongoing stream of “official” releases—a process more centralized than most others in open-
source  development—and  to  create  more  than  80%  of  new  functionality,  strict  code
ownership policies to disaggregate open-source efforts that would otherwise be too large, a
group larger by an order of magnitude than the core group to repair defects, and a group
another  order  of  magnitude  larger  yet  to  report  problems.    And  the  governance  of  such
projects and, specifically, the legal tactics employed to protect the public property that they
create, are discussed by O’Mahony [2003].
But these and other organizational issues surrounding open source, while undeniably
interesting, are far from the only ones of interest.  A second distinct set of issues concerns the
outcomes to and implications of competition between a not-for-profit open standard priced at
zero (e.g., Linux) and a for-profit closed standard (e.g., Windows).  This competitive strand
of research on open-source software is much less developed than the organizational strand
discussed above, even though the rhetoric about it—open source as innovation savior vs.
destroyer—can get quite heated.  While papers that focus on the relative efficiency of open
and  closed  development  models  are  obvious  reference  points,  they  generally  neglect
interactions between the two models and the effects of moving late vs. early in determining
competitive  outcomes  (e.g.,  Kogut  and  Metiu  [2001]).    Still,  some  specific  analytical
contributions are worth noting. Bitzer [2000] proposed a simple model to make the point that
the less the heterogeneity in product space between open-source and closed software, the
more  likely  competition  is  to  collapse  prices  below  the  levels  necessary  to  support  the
proprietary  software  developer’s  (higher)  average  costs  and  lead  it  to  abandon  its
development efforts.  Dalle and Jullien [2002] employed a simulation approach to establish
that increasing returns associated with creativity and their (re)distribution toward end-users
could  create  global  and  local  positive  externalities  strong  enough  to  help  Linux  reverse 
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current  standardization  on  Windows  2000.  And  Schmidt  and  Schnitzler  [2002]  set  up  a
simple,  essentially  static  model  of  Hotelling-like  horizontally  differentiated  competition
between an open-source product and a for-profit closed product and showed that, within that
setup,  forced  (by  the  government)  procurement  of  the  open-source  product  would
unambiguously reduce welfare.
None of these papers, however, really embeds the competition between Linux and
Windows  in  a  dynamic  model  with  demand-side  learning  of  the  sort  suggested  by  the
previous section.  Such a model is presented in Section III of this paper.
30Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Because Windows is a monopolist, demand is linear, and
unit cost is zero, every period         . But then                and                          . Therefore, in
the steady state, demand is                      .
Proof of Proposition 2. The following three properties of   




Finally,  β (y) is concave for y > y0 (assumption 4 in Section III).
Microsoft’s problem is
Because we assume that Windows has the advantage in terms of perceived value at
time t = 0, the case in which s ≤ 1 is trivial as Linux can never even get started. To analyze
the more interesting case where Linux’s demand-side learning is superior, we use standard
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Now, (A4) and (A5) form a system of differential equations in m and y.  Consider




The steady states are all those pairs            that satisfy simultaneously equations (A6)
and (A7). We now isolate m in (A6) and (A7) and investigate the shape of the resulting
functions. Solving (A6) for m, we have
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my ,Notice that (A8) is equal to 0 at y0 such that β (y0) = 0 and it is strictly positive for all
y >y0.
Solving (A7) for m, we have
(A9)
Equation (A9) equals 0 at y0 and it is strictly positive for all y > y0. Taking the
second derivative, we see that          is a concave function of y.
Equating (A8) and (A9) we see that there are two steady states. First, because 
y0 is a steady state. In this steady state, Windows is out. If y = y0 is ever reached, the only
way for Windows to stay in is by setting p(t) = 0 forever after. Second, it is easy to simplify
to get
(A10)
Let yss satisfy equation (A10). Because the function                    is always increasing
and          always decreasing,  yss is unique:





















































































y0 yss yTherefore,          has larger slope at y0 than         . In addition, 
Thus, at yss, mm=0 cuts my=0 from above. (We use this fact to determine the stability of
yss.) Because yss > y0, in this steady state Windows survives in the sense that Microsoft needs
not charge zero price in order to survive.
To sketch the directions of movement compatible with equations (A4) and (A5), we
first consider the locus         where . At a point              on the locus (A6),  is
satisfied. At a point                    , k > 0, above the locus, we have
thus,  . Similarly, we see that m is decreasing at points below the locus. Next,
consider the points for which           At a point             on the locus (A7),   is satisfied.
At a point                ,  , k > 0, above the locus, we have
thus,          . Similarly, it is easy to see that y is decreasing at points below the        line.
The following phase diagram summarizes the analysis:
Steady state yss is a saddle point and y0 is unstable. (See Kamien and Schwartz,
1991, page 178, cases (i) and (d), respectively). To see that the path leading to steady state yss
is  optimal,  one  can  easily  check  Mangasarian’s  sufficient  conditions.  (See  Seierstad  and
Sydsæter, Theorem 12, page 234.) 
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0 = m &We finally have to consider the case in which the solution to solving (A6) for m is
Replicating the above analysis yields a unique steady state at y0. This is now a
saddle point. However, phase diagram analysis reveals that along the path to the steady state,
the Hamiltonian multiplier m(t) (which is the marginal valuation of the state variable y(t) at
each moment in time) is always negative. Thus, along this path, an increase in the difference
between the perceived quality of Windows and Linux is detrimental to Microsoft’s profit. As
a consequence, the path cannot be optimal. 
Some intuition with regard to the nature of this alternative path is of interest. Notice
that  for  every  cohort,  the  period  profit  function  (π ( ρ ) )  is  a  continuously  differentiable,
concave function of ρ that crosses  (ρ = 0, π = 0), attains the unique maximum at     , and
crosses once again the point π = 0 at ρ = β (y). Because Linux is present and an increase in q
results  in  larger  future  profit,  Microsoft  will  optimally  set            (this  is  the  path
characterized in the phase diagram above). However, because of the shape of π (ρ ), there is
always a price            that yields exactly the same level of period profit. Of course, if
Microsoft was to set prices at this level in every period, y(t) would fall until y(t) = y0. This is
the (non-profit maximizing) path that corresponds to this second case.
Proof of Proposition 3. 
(a) According to equation (A10), the stable steady state yss satisfies 
Differentiating implicitly with respect to s, we get
(b) Differentiate (A10) implicitly with respect to r to get
(c) That for all finite s, yss(s) > y0 is obvious. Let s→∞ . By equation (A10)
(because both β and β ' are continuous functions of s). If                        , it would
have to be the case that but this contradicts our assumptions. Furthermore,
if                          , it would have to be the case that              , but this contradicts
our assumption that             . We conclude that                    .
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ss 0 < () <∞ →∞ lim .(d) By (A10), as → 1 + ,  we have                 .  But the only value of y for which   
is y = ∞ . Therefore, it must be that              .
(e) As                      .      For                                        to hold,         must be
sufficiently close to zero. But           only gets arbitrarily close to zero when y is
close to y0.
(f) See the proof for (d).
Proof of Corollary. Using (A1), (A9), and (A10), we solve for the steady-state
price, quantity, and profit: 
Notice, finally, that for a duopoly to happen in the steady state, it must be the case
that s > 1. Comparing the expressions above to the case of a Windows monopoly proves the
corollary.
Proof of Proposition 6. Solving Microsoft’s problem as in the proof of Proposition
2, we obtain the equation that characterizes the saddle point:
(A11)
Notice, that the right-hand side is positive for all                and negative for 
Clearly, when the right-hand side of (A11) is negative, there is no yss (with  
, so that Windows is a player) that satisfies the equation. 
Also, rewriting (A11) as
and using the fact that                             , we see that yss → y0 as              (or as               ).
Thus, as ε grows (for given s) or s grows (for given ε), Windows is effectively pushed out
by Linux.
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